The 7th, Were They Combat Ready?

[Shotgun Franklin]

And not just did they meet the standard of their day but were they ready that day of battle? Most focus is on mistakes of leadership but from everything I've read, I'm sure no expert, the average Trooper was poorly trained and ill equipped to fight a battle. I'm not even sure that a repeating rifle would have saved'm. Maybe evened the odds some but if you don't practice with a weapon how on earth will you survive a battle trying to use it. I don't have a military background but have seen Peace Officers who couldn't load under stress, couldn't operate their gun under combat conditions, as just get the thing to work, and I once had a friend blow the bottom of his holster out because he couldn't draw from his holster during a gunfight.
How many Troopers could understand and obey an order in English. That sure fouled up the message carried by the Bugler right?
Anyway, you guys seem to know a lot more than I do so what's ya'lls opinion?

[Forty Rod]

The 7th, Were They Combat Ready?

Apparently not! 

Sorry, I couldn't resist that.

Even considering being outnumbered, though, evidence suggests that they weren't trained, organized, disciplined, armed, commanded, nor in any other way "ready" for any major encounter.

[St. George]

But that's largely true of all of the Indian Fighting Army.

There weren't allocated funds for training ammunition - weapons and uniforms were left over from the Civil War, and the Quartermaster was loathe to issue out new patterns until sufficient older patterns were worn out, since Congress just wasn't all that interested in supporting a fighting force, and even forgot to pay them more than once.

Add that a significant number of soldiers and troopers were using the Army to get closer to the gold fields and to the supposed riches to be found 'out West', so they could desert and partake of them, and you now have a real leadership challenge.

Troops were trained and drilled - often by very professional Officers and NCOs - but those men were working at a disadvantage, given that their soldiers weren't there to 'soldier'.

Add this to the fact that the Indians did not stand and fight, nor did they use recognized battle formations and tactics - meaning that every engagement was a 'meeting engagement' and filled with drama.

Yesterday's Army is not the Army of the present and should not be judged by that standard - nor should their leaders, who proved themselves on different battlefields and whose experience on those battlefields was hard-won.

That there was nothing similar out on the Llano Estacado or at the Greasy Grass was not their fault - they would adapt, just as those leaders who trained for WWII ETO tactics and then found themselves in Korea and Vietnam would adapt - and 'those' leaders would adapt when faced with post-Nato conflict.

It's what we do - but adaptation in the 'Big Army' takes time, because adaptation also equals 'New Doctrine' and when you're writing the game's rules on how to conduct warfare, you really prefer that you (or someone) gets them right on the first go-around.

Hindsight 'is' 20-20 and that's all well and good when you want to dream 'What if?' - but reality trumps that dream, and harshly.

The Indian Wars version of the Seventh Cavalry - at their time - was trained well enough to rise to 'Boots and Saddles' and to engage with the weapons issued - they were trained in accordance with the available instructional material, by men who had some experience at fighting men.

That they became overtaken by events is sadly something that happens in the unholy violence of a shooting war.

Vaya,

Scouts Out!







 

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[Bob R.]

JUst to add to St. Georges points -

One should NEVER underestimate the incredible inertia in the United States Army of the mid to late 19th century, a general unwillingness to alter methods or equipment, and a parsimony that makes the budget the Victorian British army look generous in comparison. On top of that a patronage system and old boys network nearly unbreakable by any outside innovator.

In example,the Sharps/Lee Arms Company bolt action was scoffed at by the army, yet adopted successfully by the Navy, which in that era seemed to be a little more forward thinking...

Another consideration is that the material making up the professional army was largely immigrants, or next to useless natives, because of the bias 19th century Americans had against the army. They sprang to the colours as volunteers by the hundreds of thousands during the Civil War, but the average 19th century American had a deep and abiding predjudice against the army, which was looked at as a refuge for lazy men unwilling to work for a living (unfair bias, but widely held). The pay was pathetic, in comparison to civilian employment opportunities. In example, most of the New England and New York companys that volunteered for the 1st & 2nd Regiments of Berdans sharpshooters, who were not farmers (about 2/3 were 'mechanics'), made "$2 a day the year round" - $13 a month is a large step down in pay for the average skilled or semi-skilled worker. Your best material was not enlisting in peacetime, as a rule, and those enlisting deserted by the droves, as pointed out above, with the army being viewed as a paid method of transport to greener pastures.

[Trailrider]

All points well made and well taken!  Sure, there were experienced veteran soldiers, especially in the NCO and Officer corps.  But with only some exceptions, their battle experience was most likely from the CW.  The average private was lucky to be able to hit the side of a hill with his hard-kicking Springfield Carbine, let alone be any kind of marksman. (Farmers, of course, might have done some hunting, but certainly not all of them.)  Of course, the troops were given "unlimited" target practice.  Per regulations they were allowed a total of three rounds of .45-55 ammo per man per month!  Where their officers even regarded target practice as useful prior to the LBH debacle, and in the few instances where a few .50-70 Sharps Carbines or M1868 Springfield Rifle Muskets ("Long Toms") were available to supplement practice and provide for foraging in garrison, the troopers might be a bit better shots.  (Companies C, G and I, 3rd Cav, stationed at Sidney Barracks, NE, were blessed with 5 Sharps carbines and about 50,000 rounds of .50-70 ammo.  This probably stood them in good stead at the Rosebud Battle, on 17 Jun '76, but no records or reports of the effectiveness of the average trooper are mentioned in the after-action reports of Capt. Fred Van Vliet, 1Lt Emmett Crawford, or Capt. Andrews.  At least their troops mostly survived.

We can thrash and rehash the LBH battle from now until the sun goes supernova, and the facts will remain:  Custer's troops ran into a superior enemy force that was actually reacting to his attack, were isolated and cut up in detail.  Where his other battalions attained a good defensive position (after getting badly cut up when their original attack failed), they survived, albeit with heavy casualties.

[Fiddler Green]

Probably about as combat ready as the 4th ID was when they landed on Normandy.

Both units had senior officers and NCO's that had combat expierence but few at the lower levels. Thrust into the situations that they were in, both units struggled to accomplish their mission. One was almost rescued (the 4th ID) and one, was rescued (well, the survivors under Reno and Bentine).

Bruce

[Charles Isaac]

I read it on the innernet, so it must be true!

About 30 something years ago, I read in some gun rag article that the .45 Springfield and Colt M1873s that the 7th had at the battle were only recently issued and unfamiliar to the Troopers-unlike the .50 Sharps Carbines and (Remington?) cartridge conversion revolvers they were using previously.

Anybody else ever hear this? It just makes me wonder how true it is what with all the knowledge being passed around here about the battle, this has never come up-and it is somewhat important.

[Major Matt Lewis]

The Carbine Ammo also had a tendancy to jam in the chamber because of over expansion.   But as other have said, with the overwhelming forces portions of the 7th ran into and cut off from reinforcements, the only outcome that was possible occurred.

But the development of a professional NCO Corps and Officer Corps is rooted in the Indian Wars.  So, in the big picture the IW period was useful to the growth and development of the American Army.

Now, St. Georges point on changing doctrine, today's Army has REALLY come along way to document enemy TTP's and tactics.  There are groups within the Army infrastructure that a leader in the field can contact and get almost realtime information on what the bad guys are up to and how they are doing it.  It is really amazing that I can send an email requesting information on IED's in X Providence and get current info back within 24 hours.

[scooter]

   
   Looking back at the Battle, I believe that if Custer had   proper intelliigenpce of what he was up against the outcome would be deferent.  If Sitting Bull had won, it wouldn''t  have changed history anyway. 

   So Shotgun Franklin, did you shoot with the Moderators?

[scooter]

     

    I meant if Custer had won..

[MJN77]

   
   Looking back at the Battle, I believe that if Custer had   proper intelliigenpce of what he was up against the outcome would be deferent.  If Custer had won, it wouldn''t  have changed history anyway. 

It may have. Some people say Custer was looking at running for president (true or not), and if he had scored that big victory at LBH, he might have been President Custer. He was a war hero after all. That would have changed things a bit.

[W.T.]

fwiw, the forensic evidence shows that the 7th mostly had good battle discipline, forming proper firing lines, falling back and reforming again and again under fire.  there was no widespread panic or breakdown as might be expected from ill-trained troops.  both sides mostly fought afoot; no movie made to date depicts the true character of the battle.

units of the 7th stuck doggedly to the drill.  whether the tactics used here were effective is a matter for debate.  the same evidence shows that the indians moved constantly and rapidly, often firing once or twice from cover before repositioning, and rapidly thinning down the ranks of troops in the firing ranks, until the few remaining individuals, afoot or horseback, broke to try and reach other units.  in the end, the were just too many indians shooting at them.

the disparity in numbers can't be overemphasized;  in the low rises just beyond the river, indian boys had watched over herds of more than 12,000 horses.  it was plain bad command decisions in that disparity that created the disaster.

had the pleasure of walking around the LBH site and hearing a lecture by a gent who'd been working on the archaeological studies.  his explanation of who the players were and how both sides came  to be at this place were fascinating- the 7th as one of three big army groups in large scale manuver trying to corral the Sioux and their allies colliding in the middle of Crow territory.  the 7th found them first; Custer just failed to understand what he was seeing, and, being Custer, charged right in, being tempermentally disinclined to wait for link up and communication with the other large armies coming in from two other directions.

no fault to the discipline and training of the troops.  Custer just threw them away.

[Shotgun Franklin]

So Shotgun Franklin, did you shoot with the Moderators?

Usually I go shoot with'm once a year but mostly shoot with the South Texas Pistolaros now. STP is only 15 minutes from home.

[Bob R.]

fwiw, the forensic evidence shows that the 7th mostly had good battle discipline, forming proper firing lines, falling back and reforming again and again under fire.  there was no widespread panic or breakdown as might be expected from ill-trained troops.  both sides mostly fought afoot; no movie made to date depicts the true character of the battle.

units of the 7th stuck doggedly to the drill.  whether the tactics used here were effective is a matter for debate.  the same evidence shows that the indians moved constantly and rapidly, often firing once or twice from cover before repositioning, and rapidly thinning down the ranks of troops in the firing ranks, until the few remaining individuals, afoot or horseback, broke to try and reach other units.  in the end, the were just too many indians shooting at them.

the disparity in numbers can't be overemphasized;  in the low rises just beyond the river, indian boys had watched over herds of more than 12,000 horses.  it was plain bad command decisions in that disparity that created the disaster.

had the pleasure of walking around the LBH site and hearing a lecture by a gent who'd been working on the archaeological studies.  his explanation of who the players were and how both sides came  to be at this place were fascinating- the 7th as one of three big army groups in large scale manuver trying to corral the Sioux and their allies colliding in the middle of Crow territory.  the 7th found them first; Custer just failed to understand what he was seeing, and, being Custer, charged right in, being tempermentally disinclined to wait for link up and communication with the other large armies coming in from two other directions.

no fault to the discipline and training of the troops.  Custer just threw them away.

My understanding of reading the archaeology of the battle is that Benteen and Reno's commands did this, but that the companies directly under Custer fell back at a run, in a losing, running gun battle. What had been taken for a 'skirmish line' prior to the wildfire and subsequent investegation was actually a running line of retreat.

Custers immediate troops had zero chance to form anything, they ran smack into the Sioux advance. The 'last stand' sight was the stopping point in flight.

[MJN77]

My understanding of reading the archaeology of the battle is that Benteen and Reno's commands did this, but that the companies directly under Custer fell back at a run, in a losing, running gun battle. What had been taken for a 'skirmish line' prior to the wildfire and subsequent investegation was actually a running line of retreat.

Custers immediate troops had zero chance to form anything, they ran smack into the Sioux advance. The 'last stand' sight was the stopping point in flight.

 Everything I have read also stated that the battle was very fluid. The only battle line at all was were Calhoun and a dozen or so of his men were found. The bodies of Custer's command were found strung out from the river near the villiage all the way up to Custer hill. Indian testimony bares this out as well.

[W.T.]

Oh, for sure; not an organized fighting retreat.  Guy was careful to explain that evidence of such skirmish lines as had been found small unit cohesion.  This was in the summer of 2005, and work was still ongoing.  Interesting that Custer's direct command was the least organized..or maybe the most surprised and overwhelmed.

what i hadn't understood was the impact on the nation.  this happened during centennial celebrations, when we were full of national pride, and for better or worse, Custer was widely known and believed to be invincible.  the analogue my guide made is that it were as though Stromin' Norman and his entire command had been destroyed by the Iraqis in the opening days of Desert Storm.  the whole country just went reeling from shock.

every spring and summer at the LBH site on the Crow reservation, very expert folks are on hand providing fully fleshed-out explanantions of what happened and why.  i spent all day on site, listening and walking; it was one hell of an education and a visit that all the pards woulkd very much enjoy.  you come away with a real sense of tragedy and empathy for both sides.  i'm just sorry i got there a little too late for the live show.

[MJN77]

Yeah, it was a very big deal at the time. Very sad all those soldiers died like that. (not to mention the indians). The book "They Died With Custer" by Scott, Willey and Conner they discuss the archaeological evidence of the battle including the bones of the men killed there. The book says that the bones studied ranged in age anywhere from 16 to late 20s. Lot of yougsters were in the 7th. Just a sad story.

[liten]

spliting up the comand  was custers  bigest mistake, 200 stood off thousand or so for 3 hours what would have 600 done, if they hadnt been divided up , i think they were combat ready , and they all knewthey were up for a big fight at sometime in the campaign,s but management let them down

[US Scout]

Yesterday's Army is not the Army of the present and should not be judged by that standard - nor should their leaders, who proved themselves on different battlefields and whose experience on those battlefields was hard-won.

The Indian Wars version of the Seventh Cavalry - at their time - was trained well enough to rise to 'Boots and Saddles' and to engage with the weapons issued - they were trained in accordance with the available instructional material, by men who had some experience at fighting men.

Well said.  We should be very cautious in comparing the capabilities, training, weapons, etc to that of today's military. 

US Scout
Brig Gen, GAF

[US Scout]

   
   Looking back at the Battle, I believe that if Custer had   proper intelliigenpce of what he was up against the outcome would be deferent.  If Sitting Bull had won, it wouldn''t  have changed history anyway. 

 

From what I've read, Custer did have the intelligence but chose to ignore it.  He wasn't the first, nor will he be the last, to do so.

US Scout
Brig Gen, GAF